Hello everyone and welcome back to Deeper Waters where we are diving into the ocean of truth! I’m going to take the time now to respond to Hamby who responded to my review of his article on determinism. Let’s take a look at the comment that he left.
Thanks for taking the time to dig deeply into this article. It seems that your primary objection to my position is that I have presumed materialism and therefore ruled out the possibility that sentience is “immaterial.”
On the contrary, I believe I made it clear that that is not my problem. For instance, consider this paragraph I wrote:
Hamby starts from a materialistic basis. Now I’m not going to fault him for not supplying the reason for that basis. At this blog, I obviously can’t go into a basis for theism every time. It is understood that I am arguing from a theistic perspective and I hope most realize that if need be, I can give a basis for that perspective.
Later I said this:
I want to stress something at the start. If materialism is true, I agree entirely with what Hamby has said. If there is no God and matter is all we have, I hold that there is no free will.
My problem was not that Hamby assumed materialism. My problem is that I don’t think materialism can explain free-will. Note that I stated that there was no way that this could be known even if it was true. I also stated that I believe a person at a restaurant is responding to information transmitted through sound waves rather than through just sound waves and information is immaterial. I also had an ethical problem with the position he gave on sexual matters and how I believe his view lowers us to the level of animals. (Note: I realize we are rational animals, but even Aristotle made a distinction between man and beast.)
Hamby goes on to say:
Rather than type out a long rendition of what others have already said, I’ll point you to another post which points out the problems with assuming immateriality.
http://www.rationalresponders.com/039supernatural039_and_039immaterial039_are_broken_concepts
If I disapprove of assuming materialism, why would I approve of assuming immaterialism? In fact, I believe both sides in a debate have to make their case if they are arguing for something. My inability to prove theism would not prove atheism. Hamby’s inability to prove atheism would not prove theism.
Nevertheless, Hamby has given something to work with and if he wants to work further, I suggest he come to TheologyWeb. Naturally, I’m not going to go point by point through what he’s written, but I plan on hitting highlights.
Terms like “supernatural” or “immaterial” are broken concepts: They are attempts at reference that cannot actually refer to anything. They are broken terms because they are defined solely in the negative (according to what they are not) without any universe of discourse (anything left over for them to be). As Deludedgod states (see link to his page at bottom) these terms are eliminative negative terms, which can only denote an empty set, meaning that any further talk using these terms is incoherent.
This is simply logical positivism that tries to win by definition. The oddity is that this was dealt with centuries ago. We think best according to our mode of being, and our mode of being is physical so our thinking makes it difficult to think beyond the idea of matter.
In fact, the great philosophers have known for centuries what is meant by this term even if they couldn’t picture it. We still do this. What do you think of with the number 2 or with the laws of logic?
In good Thomistic thinking, which comes from Aristotle, we know what being itself is by removing all limitations from it. This would include the idea of matter and also the idea of limits, which should not be a problem since mathematicians today talk about the concept of the infinite.
The idea is that there is nothing left over for them to be according to Hamby. Why should I believe that? If I can think of concepts that are immaterial and I believe I exist, even if I don’t understand how that works, that is a limitation on my knowledge. It is not a limitation on reality and we do not limit reality to our knowledge.
Hamby goes on to say this:
So the problem isn’t just that terms like ‘immateriality’ and ‘supernatural’ are solely negative definitions, it is that they rule out any universe of discourse. There’s literally nothing left over for these terms to refer to, so there’s nothing left over for them to be. The terms are therefore meaningless, incoherent.
Why should I believe these terms are meaningless? I describe immateriality as being that is not bound by matter. I describe supernatural as being that is not confined to the natural world. I do have to start with my frame of reference and I am limited by it, but that’s not reason why I should assume reality conforms to it.
Hamby goes on to say this:
we may use the terms, and we may even feel that they ‘make sense’, but in reality the only way we can actually have them make sense is if we unconsciously steal from the concept of naturalism. And if you stop and think about it, this is what we do: we end up thinking of ‘immateriality’ in terms of materiality (i.e. energy), or ‘supernaturalism’ in terms of nature (something we can feel, see, hear, etc.).
What’s ironic is that this is also what Aquinas said long ago. In speaking in Question 3, article 3, and the first reply in the Summa, we read the following:
We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God.
This is simply the way we think and the goal is not to conform reality to our thinking but our thinking to reality.
Hamby goes on to say this:
Counter argument: “Supernatural” simply means “beyond what is natural.” There is nothing in that definition per se which means that there is no grounds for believing it.”
My Response: Unless you can show me how saying ‘beyond natural’ differs from saying ‘not natural’, you’ve given me a distinction without a difference.
Yes. I don’t see a difference that matters, but I’ve yet to be convinced that the concept is meaningless.
And later:
Counter Argument: “To support your claim, one must introduce an additional supposition — namely, that the physical universe (nature) is all that exists. This supposition is unproven and unsubstantiated.”
Response: No such supposition is required. Materialism does not rule out your view a priori – your own definition rules out providing any ontology a priori!. You are claiming that there is something beyond materialism, something transcendent, etc. Seeing as your definition rules out any possible positive terms, the burden is therefore on you to present ‘another way’, contra materialism, to render your definitions coherent. If you want to hold that the term ‘immateriality’ or ‘supernatural’ make any sense, you must provide either an ontology or a universe of discourse. If you cannot do this, if all you have is a negative definition, without any universe of discourse, then you must concede that your terms are stripped of any actual meaning… you must concede that your terms can only point to ‘nothing’. This is a problem of your own making: ergo your attempt to blame your opponent is just a sign of the weakness of your position.
Which is again logical positivism to which I have to say that Hamby is behind the times. Logical positivism could not stand up under its own criteria.
Also he says:
We can use the word ‘nature’ to denote different senses, but, the ‘two senses’ of the term are necessarily inter-related. To have a nature is to be a part of nature. The very point under discussion is whether we can talk of having a nature, sans materialism!
To say to have a nature is to be part of nature is just not accurate. I can speak of angelic nature without seeing it as part of the material world. This is again assuming the position of logical positivism and saying that things must be defined the way a materialist accepts. I’m under no such obligation.
My basic question to Hamby would be to have him explain existence itself to me. What is necessary existence. What are its properties? What does it mean to be and is there anything that is without limitation?
Throughout the rest of this, I simply see logical positivism being argued.
Hamby is free to come to TheologyWeb to deal with this there.
I conclude saying that immaterialism is never assumed by me. It is something I argue. We both have burdens. I prefer to not rule my opponent out by definition.
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